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Abstract 
Background/objective How the public behave following a nuclear emergency will help to determine 
overall levels of morbidity and mortality. Pre-event education might help to shape behaviour, but how 
best to engage people with emergency communications for low likelihood, high impact events is 
unknown. We conducted a systematic review to identify factors which predict behaviour in 
preparation for a nuclear incident; factors which predict behaviour in the immediate aftermath of a 
nuclear incident; and preferences among members of the public for information designed to educate 
them about actions to take in the event of a nuclear incident. 
Method We searched multiple databases for relevant papers. Papers were included if: they included a 
sample of the general public, related to an actual or hypothetical radiation incident, explored factors 
associated with pre- or post-incident behaviour or preferences for information receipt; used self-report 
or objective outcome data; and were published in English.  
Results We included sixteen studies which reported factors associated with preparatory behaviour, 23 
for factors associated with post-incident behaviour and 26 studies which examined information 
preferences. In general preparedness, behaviour was predicted by factors including perceived coping 
efficacy and having children amongst others, but a lack of preparedness was attributed to fatalistic 
attitudes. Importantly, for pre-incident communications to be accepted and recommendations adhered 
to, the source must be trusted and perceived to be credible, though it is notable that family needs, such 
as collecting children from school, are a stronger predictor of behaviour in a nuclear emergency than 
communicated directives from authorities.  
Conclusions If pre-incident education about nuclear incidents is to be used, a number of factors, 
including the source and method of communication, as well as the content and format of messaging, 
may increase public engagement with messages and promote the uptake of protective behaviours in a 
radiation event. 
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Introduction 
Recent advances in the capability and willingness of terrorists and state actors to use unconventional 
weapons1 have raised the spectre of catastrophic attacks against civilian populations. The potential for 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons to generate large numbers of 
casualties, economic harm and widespread fear unfortunately acts as an incentive1,2 and reports exist 
of terrorist groups trying to acquire radiological capability3 and operating weapon development 
facilities.4 
Radiological and nuclear incidents are perhaps the most alarming to the public and emergency 
planners alike. Catastrophic terrorist attacks, including use of a nuclear device, were identified as 
amongst the highest priority risks in the 2015 UK National Risk Register5 and as having the highest 
impact severity in the 2017 edition, with civil emergencies such as nuclear power plant (NPP) leaks 
also figuring highly.6 
If such events happen, public reactions will play a substantial role in determining eventual mortality 
rates.7 In one model of a nuclear detonation in Los Angeles, the potential number exposed to harmful 
radiation fell from 285,000 to 45,000 when people sheltered in even moderately protective buildings.8 
Immediate evacuation following release of radioactive material can result in increased exposure as 
well as hindering the ability of emergency responders to attend the scene.9 Other behaviours, such as 
moving quickly away from windows following the flash of a detonation10 assembling an emergency 
supply kit ahead of time11,12 and (for those near an NPP) collecting potassium iodide (KI) tablets to 
take in the event of a release7 are also likely to reduce mortality rates. However, planners have often 
assumed that panic and lack of knowledge will prevent the public from following instructions on how 
to protect themselves.13 
Generic advice has been written about how to communicate health emergency risks with the public. 
Recent guidelines emphasise, among other things, the need to consider social and cultural influences 
on risk perception,14 the importance of understanding personal risk exposure15 and media relations 
training for emergency responders.16 Yet, whether the public are likely to engage in specific protective 
behaviours during situations likely to create fear is unknown. Whilst practical guidelines do exist17 
little attention has been paid in the literature on how best to communicate with the public about 
protecting oneself in a radiation event.  While the likelihood of a major nuclear emergency remains 
low, the need to engage in protective behaviours rapidly means that if the public are to be educated 
about protective behaviour, this must happen before any incident occurs. But will the public attend to 
messages18, and what should they say in order to combat fatalism12 whilst avoiding being considered 
unnecessarily alarmist?13 To address these questions, in this systematic review we identify:   
1) factors which predict behaviour in preparation for a nuclear incident; 
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2) factors which predict behaviour in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear incident; 
3) preferences among members of the public for information designed to educate them about actions 
to take in the event of a nuclear incident.   
 
Method 
Study Identification We searched Ovid (Embase; Medline), PsycINFO (NICE HDAS), Web of 
Science and the Emergency Planning College online library 
(http://epc.cirqahosting.com/HeritageScripts/Hapi.dll/search1) from inception to January 2017. 
Keywords and MeSH terms were grouped into three categories: nuclear terms and events (e.g. 
“radiation”, “Chernobyl”), radiological terms and events (e.g. “dirty bomb”, “Litvinenko”) and 
behavioural terms (e.g. “shelter”, “evac*”). The full strategy is shown in the appendix. Searches were 
conducted up to 31st May 2017. Titles and abstracts were downloaded using Endnote software if 
potentially relevant. We undertook detailed review of the full text of papers plausibly meeting our 
inclusion criteria. 
Inclusion criteria We used five inclusion criteria. First, only studies which sampled the general 
public were included. We excluded studies if the population sampled had received occupational 
training in emergency response procedures. 
Second, we included studies relating to actual or hypothetical incidents involving a radiation hazard in 
which the potential for physical harm was present.  
Third, we included studies if they explored factors associated with behavioural response before a 
radiation incident occurred and/or in the immediate aftermath. Studies were also included if they 
assessed preferences relating to pre-event or post-event information provision.  
Fourth, we included studies if they used self-report (such as questionnaire or interview) or objective 
methods (such as footfall data) to assess actual or intended behaviour. For information preferences, 
we included outcomes measured through self-report, objective indices or any related measure.  
Fifth, due to resource constraints, we only included papers published in English.   
Data extraction Where possible, we extracted data from each study regarding design, type of 
incident, location, sample, what predictors or correlates of behaviour were studied and outcome 
assessment. 
Risk of bias We appraised the quality of included studies using Downs and Black’s19 checklist.20,21 
This has been validated for assessment of both randomised and observational studies. Items assess: 
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reporting, external validity, internal validity and confounding. Items not relevant to studies included 
in this review were not assessed (e.g. blinding). Studies were scored out of twenty-two with a high 
score equating to high quality. A table of quality assessment scores is given in supplementary 
materials. 
Procedure LG conducted the literature search, application of inclusion criteria, data extraction and 
quality appraisal with RA and GJR providing consistency checks of a subset of results.  
We grouped studies according to the predictors of behaviour that were assessed. Further subdivisions 
were based on whether incidents were nuclear or radiological, actual or hypothetical, and whether the 
study used a quantitative or qualitative approach. Differences in outcomes between studies relating to 
accidental nuclear facility radiation emergencies and deliberate detonation of nuclear or radiological 
devices are explicitly mentioned where these were apparent. 
For quantitative studies we extracted effect sizes where possible, and used a narrative approach to 
their synthesis. We used meta-ethnography to synthesise qualitative studies.22 This involves induction 
and interpretation of original data across a seven-step process allowing for building of a ‘comparative 
understanding’.23 This process allowed for identification of the clearest categorises within which 
outcomes are reported. 
Prospero registration This review was registered with Prospero on 20/01/2017 and was added to the 
Prospero database on 23/01/2017. Registration number: CRD42017055664. 
Role of the funding source The research was funded by the National Institute for Health Research 
Health Protection Research Unit (NIHR HPRU) in Emergency Preparedness and Response at King’s 
College London in partnership with Public Health England (PHE), in collaboration with the 
University of East Anglia and Newcastle University. The views expressed are those of the author(s) 
and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR, the Department of Health or Public Health England.  
The funders played no role in the writing of manuscript or decision to submit it for publication.  
The authors have not been paid to write this article by a pharmaceutical company or other agency. 
The corresponding author had full access to all the data in the review and had final responsibility for 
the decision to submit for publication. 
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Results  
Search results We identified 9480 records by database searching. Following de-duplication, another 
155 were identified from forward-citation and reference list searching of included papers, the 
behavioural science database at Public Health England and the Emergency Planning College library. 
Outcomes from four studies were reported across multiple papers.24–26,27–28,29–31,32–33 Therefore, while 
the total number of papers included was 41, the total number of studies included was 31. 
 
 
Figure 1 – PRISMA flow diagram of study selection 
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Study characteristics Thirty-three papers reported outcomes of quantitative methods, three used 
qualitative methods, three used a mixed methods approach and two employed an experimental design. 
Twenty-four studies were undertaken with US or Canadian populations and 11 with European 
populations. The remaining studies six were conducted in Japan and Australia.  
Nineteen articles (based on 13 studies) presented data on behavioural responses to real emergencies 
(including the Fukushima and Three Mile Island leaks) or events such as mass distribution of iodine 
prophylaxis, while 23 concerned hypothetical situations. See tables 1-3. 
Quality Assessment Other than two papers, those using qualitative methods tended to score poorly 
for methodological robustness, with quantitative studies receiving a mixed range of scores. Studies 
generally scored poorly for adequate adjustment for confounding variables, quality of reporting, 
description of the distribution of principal confounders, and estimates of random variability. A 
number of studies using quantitative methods failed to report probability values. Studies scored 
particularly highly for the clarity of study aims and findings, and for selecting participants from the 
same population. 
Predictors of behaviour in preparation for a radiation emergency 
16 studies reported factors associated with preparatory behaviour (see Table 4 for details). 
Information seeking  
One high quality survey34 identified several cognitive factors associated with information seeking 
about nuclear emergencies, specifically the perceived probability and likely personal impact of an 
incident, one’s perceived ability to cope, and worry. Perceptions of government or front-line 
preparedness were not associated with information seeking. In a study of people in the vicinity of 
Three Mile Island, information seekers were found to be more highly educated but were not 
necessarily those reporting the most worry.29 
Preparedness 
Individual aspects of preparedness behaviour (such as compiling a first aid kit or supplies) have been 
variously associated with being older, a resident of rural areas, having higher education,35 and with the 
perceived probability of an incident, coping efficacy, perceived front-line preparedness, and worry.34 
Few preparedness actions were found in residents near a nuclear facility who believed the site to be 
safe, but that in an emergency there would be no time to evacuate.36  
Mixed evidence was found for predictors of evacuation and sheltering preparedness, with 
preparedness being associated with having children under 18, whilst barriers to preparedness included 
denial/unwillingness and feeling unable to plan for the unknown/fatalism.37,38 
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Collection and potential use of KI was explored solely in studies of nuclear facility leak preparedness 
measures. One study found only 5% of almost 80,000 people living within ten miles of three 
Michigan NPPs collected free iodine via a voucher system. Non-collectors had planned for a nuclear 
plant emergency to a lesser extent than collectors. Stated reasons for collection included preparedness 
(58%), safety (18%), the fact that it was free (14%), and because it was recommended (13%). Reasons 
for non-collection included lack of awareness (36%), not receiving a voucher (12%), being 
‘uninterested’ (7%) and feeling it unnecessary (4%).39 In an experiment, no difference was found 
between a standard nuclear safety leaflet and one supplemented with extra information about state-
level preparedness in terms of how frequently they were kept or read by households which received 
them.40 
Adherence to evacuation recommendations 
Two studies of evacuation behaviour found pre-incident warnings of an impending nuclear attack 
would prompt 66% to leave, rising to 73% if warnings intensified such as via presidential message,41 
in contrast to 18%-19% for a radiological dispersal device (RDD) attack, rising to 24% if warned by a 
‘top local official’.38 Significantly fewer would evacuate if they learnt an actual attack was in 
progress.41 
Predictors of behaviour immediately following a radiation emergency 
23 studies tested factors associated with post-incident behaviour (see Table 5 for details). 
Information seeking 
Among British nationals living near Fukushima uncertainty about exposure to radiation or its hidden 
effects was found to cause distress and anxiety which were in-turn associated with heightened 
information-seeking behaviour.42 
Adherence to evacuation recommendations 
The leak at Three Mile Island resulted in self-evacuation of 54% of the entire local population 
following an advisory that pregnant women and children should leave.43 Self-evacuees were more 
likely than those who remained to have attained high school education and be parents.31  
The likelihood of evacuating decreased with age, increased with household size and a significant 
association existed between behaviour and behaviour of neighbours. Stated reasons for evacuating 
were having received the advisory to do so (68%), fear of harm (46%), confusion (41%) and 
anticipation of a broader evacuation order with associated problems such as traffic gridlock (8%).43 
Three lower quality studies noted situational danger (cited by 30% and 91%) or concerns around 
forced evacuation (14% to 76%).32,33,44 Reasons for non-evacuation were low perception of danger, 
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fear of looting, waiting for an order for the general public to evacuate and believing oneself to be at a 
safe distance.32,33,43,44 Receiving conflicting reports was cited as both a reason to, and not to 
evacuate.44 Conflicting evidence exists as to whether close proximity to an NPP promotes or deters 
evacuation.45-47 Two reasonably robust papers and a third less so found actual (from Fukushma26) and 
anticipated46 evacuees were more likely to be families with children under 19 and internet users.25  
Similar findings have been reported in studies assessing intended evacuation in hypothetical scenarios 
involving deliberate attacks. Here, factors promoting anticipated evacuation have included: official 
announcements, news coverage, having children under 1841 and perceived likelihood of harm.48 A 
majority of parents (55%) reported they would attempt to collect children from school during an 
incident even if knowledgeable about school evacuation plans and their children’s location.41 
Adherence to sheltering recommendations 
Participants in three qualitative studies regarding radiation attacks (two of high quality and concerning 
RDD detonation) found sheltering recommendations counterintuitive, reducing their likelihood of 
adherence.49-51 Trust in information source, perception and knowledge of the issue, checking 
information with trusted others (such as family and friends), family needs51 and receiving a leaflet 
which included decontamination information50 tended to increase adherence. A fourth study noted 
reduced adherence to sheltering in ethnic minority groups following a deliberate attack due to a desire 
to gather the family together before attempting to evacuate.52 
Studies using quantitative methods found 8% within 50 miles of an NPP53, 23% within 20km54 and 
33% in the US capital region45 were unlikely to comply with sheltering instructions in a nuclear 
emergency; 11%55 to 15.5%37 in an RDD incident. Six studies,36-38,53-55 three of high quality, found 
prioritising collection or checking on children or other family members was a primary reason for non-
adherence in both nuclear accident and deliberate attack scenarios. Anticipated adherence would 
increase if people were able to communicate with, or know that loved ones were safe55 or if they 
believed that food and water would be delivered37,38 in scenarios involving a deliberate attack. Further 
reasons for non-adherence with sheltering advice in both scenario types were low confidence or trust 
in community or government preparedness planning, feeling safer elsewhere, and to get 
supplies.45,53,55 Two studies of RDD detonation response37,55 found adherence with sheltering 
recommendations was predicted by community attachment, being over 65 and trusting the information 
source. Adherence with sheltering-at-work was 39%37 and was higher in those aware of their 
building’s sheltering arrangements or those confident in their community’s ability to manage an RDD 
attack.38 
Preferences for information in the event of a radiation incident   
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26 studies examined information preferences (see Table 6 for details). 
Information seeking 
Choice of information source Two studies explored preferred pre-incident information sources, 
finding leaflets to be preferred by 62% of residents within 3km of an NPP36 and that residents of the 
US capitol region preferred local television and radio (25% and 21% respectively), general internet 
searching (28%) and family/friends (24%/21%) for RDD information.38 
Two high quality focus group studies found preferred information sources during a nuclear attack 
would be the media (television/radio), internet, national level experts, word of mouth, emergency 
broadcast systems and local authorities,52 while young males would also seek out their peers.51 
Seven further studies explored sources during a radiation emergency using quantitative methods; high 
quality reports found friends or family, first responders,12 local or national media56 and internet 
news/government websites37 were preferred. These findings are supported by four less robust 
surveys.24,53,57,58 In an RDD emergency television network news and news or government websites 
were preferred; while social media, healthcare providers and the CDC were preferred by fewer than 
2%.38  
Pre-incident nuclear information was found to be confusing and unclear in two studies (focus 
groups52; experimental design40). For example, participants did not fully understand the terms, 
‘shelter-in-place’ and ‘plume’. Low-literacy participants given literacy aided materials reported 
increased ability to carry out instructions.59 An intervention leaflet was preferred to an existing 
nuclear safety leaflet due to greater ease of understanding, being more informative, offering a pin-up 
summary, and using preferred pictures and layout.40 Studies using focus groups and RDD scenarios 
found leaflet length, density and complexity, lack of illustrations, accessibility for disabilities60 and 
recommendations without explanation50 to be criticisms, whilst a live voice delivering messages was 
preferred to a recording during an incident.49 
Preferences for information content Pre-incident, 77% of the US public expressed interest in knowing 
government and community RDD response plans55 whilst 77% of participants presented with a 
scenario in which radiological materials were found in possession of terrorists would seek health-
related information.60  
Following the incident at Three Mile Island,43 some (number not reported) sought information on 
impact, whilst British nationals in Japan made requests for more information, consistency, clarity and 
regular updates during the Fukushima disaster.42 In a hypothetical nuclear emergency, guidance on 
countermeasures and food safety would be sought by 86% of Italian respondents.58 
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One focus group study using a hypothetical RDD emergency found desired information to include 
protective actions, water/food contamination, actions of authorities and requests for behavioural 
recommendations according to how close someone was to the site of the incident.50 
Perceived credibility of information source  
Multiple studies explored trust and credibility. Their results varied: UK non-governmental sources,60 
scientists (also rated most competent alongside authorities61) and the US President38 all tended to be 
rated as most trustworthy, followed by local public health departments53 and national news/media.37,57 
Least trusted were US national media and local authorities,38,51 nuclear industry,61 local religious 
leaders and government.37,57  
In general, increased trust was associated with consistency between messengers and messaging from 
authorities, such as expert medical advice50, whilst perceived reliability was associated with the use of 
basic terminology,30 and increased confidence with recommended protective actions having been 
proven effective.52 A series of studies demonstrated that acceptance of information during an incident 
was predicted by one’s level of agent-specific knowledge, trust in the message source, 27,62 whether the 
disaster is assumed to have low potential to cause personal harm and being from a directly affected 
population.28 
Regarding information preferences of different subgroups, Bass63 found low literacy (mostly ethnic 
minority) survey respondents fell into three categories based on their perceptions of information 
sources and anticipated adherence: those most likely to trust that information is accurate and to adhere 
to sheltering instructions despite believing that authorities are unlikely to provide them with the same 
level of support as they do others; those least likely to adhere or prepare out of distrust in authorities 
and their information and; those likely to adhere to sheltering instructions given by local, but not 
national sources.   
 
Discussion  
How the public would behave immediately following a catastrophic nuclear or radiological incident is 
uncertain. For example in a hypothetical RDD or nuclear scenario most people in the US capital 
region report that they would shelter-at-home or in their workplace.38,45 whereas actual nuclear 
incidents have seen self-evacuation to be common, particularly among those receiving information 
felt to be confusing or unclear.40,52 Given the likely link between behaviour and the overall health 
effects of a nuclear incident, encouraging protective behaviours should be a priority. 
Recommendations are listed in box 1. 
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Encouragingly, rates of information seeking suggest a desire amongst the public to learn protective 
actions.34,50,52,55,58,60 This includes a wish to understand pragmatic issues, many of which could only be 
addressed after the specifics of an incident are understood. Some aspects could be addressed prior to 
any incident, however. In particular, studies of public communication around NPP emergencies 
display a desire to better understand risk (such as of the event happening) whilst regarding a 
deliberate attack there is a clear desire to understand threat (such as the likelihood of harm coming to 
those not directly affected). Immediately following the Fukushima emergency, for example, more 
than one-third of questions posed over the internet sought radiation-related knowledge.64 
Yet are the public receptive to messages about radiation or protective behaviour in advance of an 
incident occurring? Theories surrounding the uptake of protective behaviour in other contexts suggest 
that certain pre-requisites may be required before messages are attended to or acted on, including a 
degree of perceived threat and a perception that the recommended behaviour may be effective.65 In the 
absence of such conditions, information campaigns may be ignored or quickly forgotten.18 In contrast, 
public information campaigns can increase knowledge,59,66 which may increase receptivity to future 
messages when a threat becomes more apparent.27 Certainly, in the literature we have reviewed, 
perception of risk appears to be an important predictor of behaviour, influencing: acceptance of 
messages,28 taking preparatory measures (fewer in those with high radiation risk perception),36 self-
evacuation48 and information seeking.60 Communicating with the public while perceptions of risk are 
low may result in messages being ignored.  Nonetheless, if pre-incident communication is to be used, 
our results do offer guidance regarding what information should be given and how it should be 
conveyed. 
Source and Method 
A trend for greater preference for traditional media sources exists for pre-incident information relating 
to NPP emergency preparedness than for attack scenarios, whereas more would seek information 
using the internet if an attack were to occur. However, the shift towards public preparedness against 
catastrophic terror in the risk communication literature, precipitated by the WTCD attacks in 2001 
coincided with the rise of the internet and social media. Changes over time in communication 
technology inevitably raise questions about applicability of older findings to the current context. 
Nonetheless the general point raised by many studies would seem to remain true: people will seek 
information from sources they trust. 
Receiving messages from trusted sources was highlighted in multiple studies, though opinions 
inevitably differed as to who is trusted. A comparison of sources61 found government authorities were 
viewed as most credible (and were a preferred pre-incident source24,37,38,53,57,58), although scientists 
were considered more trustworthy and equally competent as nuclear industry. The nuclear industry, 
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despite being perhaps best placed to provide information regarding radiation safety, appear least 
trusted to do so. If an incident were to occur, the public also want to hear from sources with 
knowledge particular to them and their area, such as local media, local authorities or friends and 
family, suggesting a primary concern in knowing how personally affected they might be as opposed to 
the national situation.  
Given this heterogeneity, perhaps the best that can be recommended is the old adage of multiple 
sources ‘speaking with one voice’; having messages endorsed by multiple experts and agencies 
increases the chances of them being accepted17.  In today’s media climate this approach may be 
difficult to achieve. In many instances, the media actively seek out opposing views,67 oftentimes 
subjective in nature,68 which increases distrust of scientists and public health messages.69 The finding 
that scientists appearing on national media lost credibility60 highlights this point.  It is perhaps 
unrealistic to expect one-voice communication to occur in an incident of this nature. The 2018 false 
alert of a nuclear attack in Hawaii is an example in which the authoritative voice was one of many and 
was arguably lost amongst social media feeds. This perhaps supports the apparent need for 
corroboration of information from peers.51 Ideally, different endorsements are needed for different 
groups. For example, one high quality study51 conducted with low-income residents of urban areas 
found most trust in local media and a need to have an established community spokesperson endorse 
authority recommendations further. 
 
Content and format 
Two experiments were included in this review both of which found clarity and ease of understanding 
were commonly requested both pre- and during incident messaging. This is a pressing concern 
amongst low literacy individuals who may require decision aided materials which would improve 
knowledge of actions and intention to adhere to sheltering instructions as was the outcome of one 
experiment.59 However, this was also expressed within the wider public. Consistency in messages 
within and across sources is also desirable and associated with adherence to recommendations.32,33,51 
Inevitably, substantially more information is desired immediately following an incident than pre-
incident, relating to issues such as food and water contamination,58 actions of authorities and 
recommendations specific to where the individual is at that time,50 as well as regarding the likelihood 
of further attacks.60 
The other experiment, a study of the effectiveness of a pre-incident communications leaflet40 found 
advisories best recalled were arguably those with the most personal impact on the recipient, such as 
not collecting children from school and not using mobile phones. Instructions less well recalled (e.g. 
to take KI if told to) are perhaps considered out-of-the-ordinary in terms of activities undertaken 
regularly or are ones not previously considered. Other criticisms of leaflets such as excessive length, 
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density and complexity, lack of illustrations, accessibility issues for disabilities and recommendations 
backed up by facts without explanations represent potential barriers to the reception of information; 
however, whilst recall of certain advisories increased with a developed leaflet, no significant 
difference in intended adherence or understanding was found. 
Several instances of apparent fatalism hindering the likely uptake of messages were found. For 
example, many individuals living close to an NPP felt that preparing for an emergency was not 
worthwhile since they would not have time to evacuate36 and were disinterested in collecting free 
KI.39 To encourage preparedness, pre-incident communications should provide information regarding 
the efficacy of the suggested behaviour. This may require a degree of education about the nature of 
radiation, the mechanism underlying the benefits of KI, conditions under which evacuation or 
sheltering would be appropriate and how people might be informed as to which action is 
recommended depending on the nature of the incident. 
Greater detail in communications regarding the processes that exposed survivors might experience, 
such as an explanation of decontamination procedures,50 may increase adherence. Adherence to 
recommendations will likely increase if the public can be reassured, for example, that food and water 
can be delivered to them whilst sheltering47 or that they can be evacuated to somewhere where support 
will be offered. This extends to psychological support.36 
In addition to neighbours and friends influencing behavioural responses, with individuals looking to 
the actions of others to inform their own decisions, family needs are fundamental in shaping actions, 
with several studies33,38,41,43,48,50,54,55 identifying a desire to collect children from school and make 
contact with loved ones, even at the expense of increasing exposure to radioactive material. This latter 
phenomenon has been observed in previous non-radiological incidents18 and must be addressed in pre-
incident communications, perhaps by providing parents with information as to what the responsibility 
of schools are in protecting children. 
Gaps in understanding 
A number of gaps emerged from the literature that appear central to our understanding of effective 
public communication in the pre-incident phase. One gap relates to use of social media in radiation 
emergency communications. Social media is likely used by a large number who would choose the 
internet as a source and method of information gathering following an incident.  It is unclear at this 
stage to what extent social media could be used to disseminate and promote pre-incident public 
education for radiological and nuclear emergencies. Secondly, more data is needed on how different 
information sources can foster trust in the public. Trust is central to whether information is accepted 
and recommended actions adhered to. Previous studies have largely quantified levels of trust in 
sources and few have explored the facilitation of trust, or distrust. 
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The longer-term impact of any information campaign is a third key knowledge gap. Hopefully, any 
pre-event messages that are disseminated will never need to be used. However, maintaining 
knowledge over time is important.  To date, studies have generally only focused on the immediate 
impact of messages. Whether messages about high impact events which later do not come to pass 
have a wider, detrimental, effect on the credibility of future messages on related issues is also 
unknown.70 This presents a challenge for communicators, and the frequency with which messages 
need to be repeated and reinforced is an area worthy of further investigation.  
Limitations 
Relatively few studies included in this review provided evidence about actual observed behaviour. 
Those that were available often suffered from methodological deficits, possibly related to their 
reactive nature and the need to begin research promptly during the immediate period following an 
emergency. It was therefore necessary to include anticipated behavioural responses from hypothetical 
scenarios in drawing our conclusions. Arguably, studies using hypothetical scenarios are flawed: how 
can members of the public be expected to know how they would react or what information they would 
want in such extreme circumstances? A possible counter to this is that many studies used well 
researched and realistic injects in their studies; yet the difference between viewing a news report of a 
real attack taking place versus watching it from the comfort of a focus group is inescapable. In 
exploring anticipated adherence and information needs in a radiation emergency, hypothetical studies 
make up the majority of research in this area. Though the methodological quality of hypothetical 
scenario studies in this review was stronger than that of studies from actual events in most instances, 
this limitation must be considered in our interpretation of results.   
One observation of study quality was the absence of effect sizes reported for some studies using 
quantitative methods. This made comparison between study outcomes difficult, allowing us to judge 
only whether findings were generally in the same direction. Future research in this area should 
address this in order to ensure direct comparison can be made between populations.  
The literature would also benefit from variation in the populations studied: few studies explored 
information preferences across populations with potentially differing information needs. In addition, 
few studies used mixed methods; meaning information gathered regarding potential predictors of 
behaviour (such as using focus groups) were not explored further in terms of strength of predictors.  
Finally, available resources meant that we could only include studies published in English in our 
review.  There are likely to be studies conducted in other countries that have experienced nuclear 
incidents or a nuclear threat (e.g. Japan and South Korea) where efforts to prepare the public have 
been ongoing for some time.  A future review should seek to identify studies published in languages 
16 
 
other than English, focusing particularly on countries that have been observed to implement pre-
incident public information campaigns.   
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the decision to use pre-incident communication regarding protective behaviours for use in 
such a high impact, low likelihood event is likely to be a political one.  Our review highlights a 
number of factors that could increase engagement with key messages, and promote the uptake of 
protective behaviours and emergency interventions that will save lives in the unlikely event of a 
catastrophic radiation emergency. Without consideration of best practice in pre-incident public 
communication for radiation emergencies a catastrophic incident could become worse than we 
currently fear; it is essential that we plan for this.  
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Box 1. Recommendations based on the findings of this review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Pre-incident communication regarding preparedness actions should be targeted at the 
recipient population (i.e. residents close to an NPP should receive advice regarding KI 
collection and use) 
• Advisories as to potential actions (evacuation; shelter-in-place) should include details as 
to how individuals can find out which action is most suitable to them (such as based on 
their location to the emergency), and who they can expect to give this information 
• Information regarding recommended actions should clearly explain reasons why these 
might be advised, including the circumstance under which there might be a danger in non-
adherence 
• Preferred methods of distribution are likely to differ: pre-incident information will benefit 
from being accessible in the public’s own time such as leaflet, letter or website 
information, whereas information distributed during an incident are likely to involve a 
preference for internet communications  
• Information should seek to minimise uncertainty in the public by outlining frequently 
requested information including exposure effects (means of contamination; symptoms), 
protective actions to take and the length of time people may potentially be required to 
shelter 
• Pre-incident information should include links to further information including low-
literacy aided and preferred language materials 
• Information should specifically address the impact on families/children such as protective 
actions for parents/caregivers to take, actions to take if children are at school in an 
incident and health effects for children 
• Evidence supporting advisories should be provided (potentially making reference to past 
radiation events and to scientific evidence) but should be presented in clear, non-jargon 
language making clear that the actions outlined have been proven to offer protection and 
increase safety 
• Potential food and water contamination should be addressed including what could safely 
be consumed 
• Actions that would be taken by authorities, particularly regarding public protection, in the 
event of a radiation emergency should be addressed where possible 
• Combined sources may be used in presenting information: for example, messages 
presented by recognised government officials should cite health protection agencies 
and/or nuclear industry sources 
• Where multiple sources make information available, a consistent message must be relayed 
• Basic terminology should be used in all communications   
• Information presented in the event of a radiation emergency should echo information 
presented pre-incident with reassurance given that if pre-incident communications were 
not received or have been forgotten that there are ways of accessing them still if 
opportunity allows) 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1. Methodologies for studies involving nuclear agents (Survey designs) 
Ref Study Design Participant demographics (if listed) Inclusion criteria Variables measured  Event / location  
63. Survey (face-to-face) N=50; 58% female; ages 18-88  Low literacy adults recruited from 
local community 
Predictors of adherence with sheltering instructions Hypothetical RDD 
scenario / US 
52. Secondary survey data: 
Marist College Institute for 
Public Opinion: 
government threat 
protection; Pew Internet 
and American Life Project 
Not reported 
 
None specified Information seeking (preferred source, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility; Predictors of adherence with 
sheltering instructions 
Hypothetical small IND / 
US 
58. Survey (unspecified) (71% 
response rate) 
N=353; 45% females; ages <25 to >70 Local area agricultural group 
members 
Information seeking (preferred source, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility 
No scenario used / Italy 
43. Survey (postal) 
(40% response rate) 
N=359  Residents in 5 mile radius of TMI  Information seeking Three Mile Island / US 
45. Survey (telephone) 
 
N=800 (83% white ethnicity; 66% employed; 
66% married) 
Residents within states surrounding 
Washington DC 
Perceived source credibility; Predictors of adherence with 
sheltering instructions; Predictors of adherence with 
evacuation instructions 
Hypothetical nuclear 
detonation / US 
38. Survey (telephone) 
 
N=2657 
 
Residents of national capital region 
(Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
West Virginia, Delaware, Columbia 
District) 
Information seeking (preferred source, -pre-incident); 
Information seeking (preferred source, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility; Predictors of adherence with 
sheltering instructions; Predictors of preparedness 
behaviour 
Hypothetical RDD 
scenario / US 
44. Survey (telephone) 
(Survey 1: 75% response 
rate; Survey 2: 82%; 
Survey 3: response rate 
unreported) 
Survey 1: N=692; Survey 2: N=1506; Survey 
3: N=954 (sample close to national norm for 
heads of household age, gender, Hispanic 
ethnicity. Below norm for African American 
ethnicity, single status. Above norm for marital 
status, family size) 
Survey 1: residents within 0-5 mile 
radius of TMI; Survey 2: residents 
within 0-55 mile radius of TMI; 
survey 3: unknown  
Perceived source credibility; Evacuation behaviour 
(actual); Sheltering behaviour (actual) 
Three Mile Island / US 
26. Survey (paper) 
(79.60% response rate) 
N=1110; 29% female; ages: <30 to >60 Radiation seminar attendees; not 
subject to mandatory evacuation 
Evacuation behaviour (actual) 
 
Fukushima / Japan 
24; 
25. 
Survey (80.3% response 
rate) 
 
N=1119; 26% female; ages: <40 to >60 Health seminar (Fukushima 
Occupational Health Promotion 
Centre) attendees 
Information seeking (preferred source, pre- and during 
incident); Predictors of adherence with evacuation 
instructions 
Fukushima / Japan 
55. Survey (telephone) 
 
N=2545 (Small differences between samples 
and corresponding estimates from 3-year 
averages (2001–2003)  
 Information seeking (pre- incident); Perceived source 
credibility; Predictors of adherence with sheltering 
instructions; Predictors of preparedness behaviour 
Hypothetical RDD 
scenario / US 
61. Survey (face-to-face) N=1031; 51% female; ages: 18 to 55  Perceived source credibility Simulated TV news 
segment(s) / Belgium 
34. Survey (telephone) 
(9.70% response rate) 
N=1502; 51% female  Predictors of preparedness behaviour; Predictors of 
information seeking; Predictors of avoidance behaviour 
CBRN terrorism / 
Canada 
35. Survey (telephone) 
(9.70% response rate) 
N=1502; 51% female   Information seeking (preferred source, pre-incident) No scenario used  / 
Canada 
36. Survey (unspecified) 
(50% response rate) 
N=502  Residents within 3km of Krško NPP 
 
Information seeking (preferred sources, pre-incident); 
Predictors of preparedness behaviour  
Hypothetical evacuation  
/ Slovenia 
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45. Survey (telephone) 
 
N=248 
 
Residents within 10 mile radius of 
TMI 
Evacuation behaviour (actual); Predictors of adherence 
with evacuation instructions 
Three Mile Island / US 
62. Survey (online) 
 
N=9249; 46% female; ages: 20-69 Residents of Fukushima, Tokyo or 
Osaka 
Information seeking (preferred sources, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility 
Fukushima / Japan 
41. Survey (telephone) 
(80% response rate) 
N=200  
 
Random selection from local area 
phone directory; residents over 18 
years 
Evacuation adherence (anticipated); Sheltering adherence 
(anticipated) 
Hypothetical nuclear 
attack / US 
53.  Survey (face-to-face) 
(91% response rate) 
N=192  Residents within 50 miles of an 
NPP 
Information seeking (preferred source, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility 
No scenario used / US 
60. Surveys (telephone)   
 
 
N=2005 (Britain: N=1000; Germany: 
N=1005); 56% female; mean age: 50.1 
(SD=15.6)  
 Information seeking (preferred source, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility; Predictors of information 
seeking; Predictors of avoidance behaviour 
Hypothetical RED 
scenario / Britain; 
Germany 
27; 
28. 
Survey (Belgium: face-to-
face; Slovenia: telephone)   
 
N=1031 (Belgium; representative of 
population for province, region, level of 
urbanization, gender, age, and professional  
status); N=983 (Slovenia; representative of 
adult population for gender, age, education, 
level of urbanization, region) 
Residents within vicinity of facility Predictors of preparedness behaviour; Predictors of 
information seeking; Pre-incident knowledge; Predictors 
of risk information acceptance 
 
Radio-isotope  facility 
leak (Fleurus); KI 
distribution campaign 
(Belgium); Long-term 
radioactive waste 
disposal (Slovenia) 
32; 
33. 
Secondary survey data: 
Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (telephone 
survey); Rutgers 
University; Michigan State 
University (postal surveys) 
Not reported  Evacuation behaviour (actual); Sheltering behaviour 
(actual) 
Three Mile Island / US 
47. Survey (postal) 
(44% response rate) 
38% female (under-representation of older 
respondents) 
 Predictors of adherence with evacuation instructions Hypothetical nuclear 
plant accident / UK 
29; 
30; 
31. 
Survey (paper) N=117; 49% female; mean age: 41  
 
Attendees of TMI Public Health and 
information workshop series on 
cancer, radiation and epidemiology 
Perceived source credibility; Information seeking (during 
incident) 
 
 
Three Mile Island / US 
57. Survey  (unspecified) 
 
N=502; 52% female; ages: 18 to 65  
 
 Information seeking (preferred source, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility 
Hypothetical RDD 
scenario  / US 
42. Survey (online) N=284; 28% female; ages: 18-46 British nationals living in or near 
Fukushima 
Information seeking (preferred source, during incident) Fukushima / Japan 
12. Survey (postal/online) 
 
N=324; 48.5% female; ages:  <25 to 65 
 
Members of Australia Nuclear 
Science & Technology mailing list 
Information seeking (preferred source, during incident) No scenario used / 
Australia 
54. Survey (postal) 
(28% response rate) 
N=1407 (representative of population, mostly 
male, > 80%, homeowners)  
Residents within 20km of major 
nuclear installations 
Predictors of KI use Nuclear awareness 
campaign / Belgium 
56. Survey (face-to-face) N=938 (population representative sample)  Information seeking (preferred source, during incident) Fukushima / Belgium 
37. Survey (telephone) 
 
N=1071 (Females over represented: 60%)  
 
Residents of the National Capital 
Region  
Information seeking (preferred source, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility; Predictors of adherence with 
sheltering instructions; Predictors of adherence with 
evacuation instructions; Predictors of preparedness 
behaviour; Predictors of information seeking 
Hypothetical RDD 
scenario / US 
 
46. Survey (telephone) 
 
N=2595 Residents of Nassau and Suffolk 
Counties (vicinity of Shoreham 
NPP) 
Evacuation adherence (anticipated); Predictors of 
adherence with evacuation instructions 
Hypothetical evacuation 
/ US 
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39. Survey (telephone)  
(60% response rate) 
N=153; KI users: 60% female, KI non-users: 
59% female; Mean age, KI users: 
63.3(SD=13.7), KI non-users: 60.1(SD=15.2) 
78 free KI voucher users; 75 non-
users; residents within 10 mile of 
nuclear plant. 
Information seeking (during incident); Predictors of KI 
use 
KI distribution campaign 
/ US 
 
 
 
Table 2. Methodologies for studies (qualitative designs e.g. Focus Groups, interviews) 
Ref Study Design Participant demographics (if listed) Inclusion criteria Relevant topics of discussion  Event / location  
51.  Focus groups   N=37; 32% female; ages: 18–65  African-American; urban residential 
attendees of community centres 
Predictors of instruction adherence Hypothetical RDD  
scenario  / US 
52. 16 Focus groups (12 w/ 
general public) (4 w/ first 
responders not included in 
review) 
N=163 (focus groups total); 52% female; mean 
age: 42.6  
12 public groups: 3 African 
American groups (2 urban, 1 rural); 
3 white (2 urban, 1 rural); 3 
Hispanic (2 urban, 1 rural); 1 Asian 
(urban); 1 English second language, 
1 Indigenous American 
Information seeking (preferred source, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility; Predictors of adherence with 
sheltering instructions 
 
Hypothetical small IND 
scenario / US 
36. Semi-structured interviews Not reported Leaders of institutions (e.g. head 
teachers); residents  within 3km of 
Krško NPP 
Information seeking (preferred sources, pre-incident); 
Predictors of preparedness behaviour  
Hypothetical evacuation 
/ Slovenia 
49. Focus groups 
 
N=108; 48% female; ages: 25-54  Information seeking (preferred source, during incident) IND message testing 
/ US 
60. Phase 1: focus groups (7 
British, 5 German); Phase 
3: focus groups (using 
intervention leaflet)  
 
Phase 1: N=52 (Britain), N=35 (German); 
Phase 2: N=570 (Britain), N=563 (Germany)  
 
 
Britain: purposive sampling: 
parents/ travellers through mainline 
London train station; Germany: 
random selection from Stuttgart 
City Records 
Information seeking (preferred source, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility; Predictors of information 
seeking; Predictors of avoidance behaviour 
 
Hypothetical RED 
scenario / Britain; 
Germany 
50. Focus Groups Phase 1: N=22; phase 2: N=64 (mix of gender, 
age, ethnicity, education and parents)  
 Information seeking (preferred source, pre-incident); 
Information seeking (preferred source, during incident); 
Perceived source credibility; Predictors of adherence with 
sheltering instructions; predictors of adherence with 
recommended actions (general) 
Hypothetical RDD 
scenario  / UK 
 
 
Table 3. Methodologies for studies (Experimental designs) 
Ref Study Design Participant demographics (if listed) Inclusion criteria Aims measured Event / location  
59. Pilot test of decision aid 
tool 
 
N= 50 (Intervention group: N=29; Control: 
N=21); 48% female; ages: 23-67  
Low literacy adults recruited from 
community sites 
Predictors of adherence with sheltering instructions Hypothetical RDD 
scenario  / US 
40. Field evaluation of leaflet 
(survey; focus group); 
(Survey: 16.5% response 
rate); Intervention:  8% 
response rate) 
Survey: N=631; 55% female; mean age 53.2; 
Focus groups: N=30; 25 females; mean age 
43.5; Intervention phase: N=112 
Residents within radius of nuclear 
sites; higher and lower income 
households 
Predictors of preparedness behaviour; Information 
preferences 
Nuclear safety 
information leaflet 
distributed by NPP 
operator to homes within 
2km radius; Trial leaflet 
/ UK 
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Table 4. Predictors of behaviour in preparation for a radiation emergency (significant effects in bold) Risk of 
bias score 
Information 
Seeking 
34. (QN) Predictors: perceived probability (β=0.16, t=4.88, p<0.001), perceived personal impact (β=0.08, t=1.93, p=0.05), coping efficacy (β=0.10, t=3.43, p<0.001), worry 
(adjusted R2=0.05, F(3, 1096)=21.80, p<0.001, with β=0.19, t=6.22, p<0.001); negatively associated with perceived seriousness (β=-0.08, t=−2.05, p<0.05); perceived 
government or front-line preparedness not significant 
29. (QN) Information seekers near TMI were more highly educated and male but not necessarily those reporting most worry (effect not reported) 
16 
 
 
17 
Preparedness 57. (QL; QN) 63% not feeling prepared for RDD attack; 36% stocked food, 35% water 
48. (QN)~62% ‘very’/ ‘somewhat’ prepared to stay away from home  >one week 
34. (QN) Predictors: perceived probability (β=0.25, t=7.98, p<0.001), perceived coping efficacy (β=0.06, t=2.15, p<0.05), perceived front-line preparedness (β=0.15, t=4.06, 
p<0.001); worry (adjusted R2=0.05, F(3,1096)=21.95, p. <0.001, with β=0.25, t=8.10, p<0.001). Perceived seriousness, governmental preparedness, self-efficacy, personal impact not 
significant 
35. (QN) Older respondents more likely to have emergency supply kit (F(1, 827)=12.16, p<.001); urban area residents established emergency plans (F(1, 1438)=4.34, p<.05), 
put together emergency supply kit (F(1, 1438)=6.50, p<.05), obtained information about potential shelters (F(1, 1438)=4.73, p<.05) to lesser extent than rural residents; less 
educated respondents received first aid or CPR training to a lesser extent (F(1, 1430)=9.17, p<.01) 
36. (QN) Few preparedness behaviours due to belief nuclear sites are safe/ in emergency there would not be time to evacuate (effect not reported) 
53. (QN) ~85% had 3-day supply of non-perishable food, 76% a way to cook without utilities; 65%a 3-day supply of drinking water; 67% prepared a first-aid kit, (among households 
with medication users) 63% had a 7-day supply 
39. (QN) 5% collected free KI; voucher non-users reported not having planned for a NPP emergency to a greater extent (60%) than users (26%) x2=18.47, p<.0001); reasons 
for (pre-incident) uptake of KI: be prepared (58%), safety (18%), free (14%), recommended (13%); reasons for non-use: not knowing about program (36%), ‘don’t know’ (19%), 
didn’t receive voucher (12%), ‘not interested’ (7%), felt KI unnecessary (4%) 
38. (QN) 40% had some preparedness plans including respondents who experienced an event that caused them to stay at home or to evacuate, more highly educated, those with 
children <18, older respondents (effects not reported); differences regarding race, geographic location, income not significant; barriers to preparedness: denial/ unwillingness (22%), 
other priorities (17%), lack of time (15%), no reason (12%), cant plan for unknown/ fatalism (10%), ‘don’t know what to do’ (9%), lack of money/ resources (3%) 
37. (QN) 27% stored food for >10 days, 31% 6-10 days, 15% <6 days, 27% none; 21% water stored for >10 days, 17% 6-10 days, 21% <6 days, 41% none; ~0.4% reported no 
sheltering capacity; respondents with children, pet owners, those with strong community attachment, full-time workers,  those aged 50-64 more likely to have a designated meeting 
place; education and income not predictors 
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16 
Adherence to 
recommendations 
61. (QL) Acceptance of (pre-incident) recommendations not affected by perceived credibility of actor giving information  
62. (QN) Trusters of central government believed information accurate (B=1.97, 95%CI=1.73–2.24)/ accepted risks (B=2.04, 95%CI=1.80–2.32) 
41. (QN) 66% would leave if warned via media of impending nuclear attack, if warning intensified (such as televised Presidential message) 73% would probably/ definitely leave; 
fewer (48%) would leave if learned of actual attack occurring (compared with media warning (x2=5.98, df=1 p<.01) or presidential TV warning (x2=9.96,df=1, p<.01) 
27. (QN) Perception of radiation risks (β=-0.3, SE=0.04), prior knowledge (β= 0.2, SE=0.02) most influential acceptance predictors of message acceptance (Slovenia: e.g. 
‘LILW will not cause health consequences’); prior knowledge (β=-0.357, SE=0.042), attitude towards science and technology (β=-0.350, SE=0.116), perception of radiation 
risks (β=0.264, SE=0.1), living close to NPP (β=0.739, SE=0.242) predicted acceptance of messages (Belgium); differences in message acceptance between respondents living 
farther from NPP and local population (Slovenia: β= 0.1; Belgium: B=0.7); confidence in authorities not significant 
28. (QN) Interaction of specific knowledge and trusting authorities predicted message acceptance in affected population (β =0.029, SE=0.009, p<0.01); specific knowledge not 
significant (joint effect of specific knowledge and disaster potential did predict acceptance in general population (β= .13, SE=0.42, p<0.01); attitude toward science and 
technology marginally significant effect on acceptance in affected population (those with a more positive attitude less inclined to accept messages (β=-1.077, SE=0.402, 
p<0.05)); respondents believing NPP accident potentially disastrous accepted messages less than those assuming low disaster potential in general (β=−1.66, SE=0.540, 
p<0.01) and directly affected (β=.46, SE=0.108, p<0.001) populations; education and age not significant 
38. (QN) 18%-19% would evacuate if given prior notice of incident; 19% would leave location if instructed by Governor/ Mayor (highest level of shelter-in-place adherence), 21% if 
local fire chief, 24% if ‘a top local official’ or  ‘the local emergency manager’ 
40. (Experiment) 86% adhered to instructions to keep both leaflets (94% read both) 
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Table 5. Predictors of behaviour immediately following a radiation emergency  (significant effects in bold) Risk of 
bias score 
Information 
Seeking 
42. (QN) Uncertainty (e.g. doubt around exposure) caused emotional symptoms: distress, anxiety, anger, found to predict information seeking behaviour  19 
Adherence to 
recommendations 
 
 
52. (QL) Minority groups would ‘start rounding up…family’ in reaction to a nuclear emergency 
49. (QL) Respondents found sheltering directives counterintuitive (such as feeling that staying inside was not safe), would likely not follow instructions to shelter-in-place 
51. (QL) Adherence associated with trust in source, perception of scenario, knowledge of issue, collaboration of information, family-centric needs (women/older people would check 
safety of children before evacuating) 
50. (QL)  Receiving leaflet intervention (including information about decontamination) a strong influencer on adherence  
43. (QN) 39% within 5 miles of TMI evacuated (54% did so following advisory that only pregnant women and children evacuate); significant association between behaviour and 
behaviour of neighbours (x2=56.83, df=2, p=.000, Goodman and Kruskal Tau=0.159); reasons for evacuating: advisory itself (68%; 21% living outside 5 mile radius, 28% had 
children), fear of harm (46%), confusion (lack of leadership, conflicting information (41%)), peer pressure (9%), anticipating evacuation order/ associated problems (traffic (8%)); 
reasons for non-evacuation: social influence (such as neighbours’ behaviour (effect not reported), little perception of danger, fear of looting, waiting for order, proximity to hazard, 
age, household size 
48. (QN) 92% ‘very’/‘somewhat’ likely to adhere with evacuation instructions  (91% in dirty bomb emergency); sources cited as most important in evacuation decision: official 
announcement (43%), news coverage (43%), family/ friends (8.5%); ~67% likely to shelter if news coverage is unavailable; 19.5% with no confidence in government preparedness 
planning very unlikely to follow shelter-in-place advice (~5% with confidence unlikely to adhere to sheltering directive) (x2=55.63 (n=773), p<.001); 78% who perceive high 
likelihood that attack could harm them/ their family likely to evacuate x2=70.57 (9, n=748), p <.001, effect size γ=.32); 90% in dirty bomb scenario (x2=70.57 (9, n=748), 
p<.001, effect size γ=.32) 
44. (QN) ~60% of households had at least one person self-evacuate during TMI; reasons for evacuation: confused by information (reducing trust in government), situation perceived 
dangerous (w/ influence of friends/ neighbours: 82%), avoid forced evacuation (68%); reasons for not evacuating: ‘whatever happens is in God’s hands’ (70%), waiting for order 
(62%), believing no danger (30%)  
25. (QN) Internet users more likely than non-users to evacuate with families to lower radiation areas (Mantel–Haenszel test conducted, p<.01); positive relationship 
between internet usage and preventative behaviours (internet users: M=2.6, SD=2.1; non-users: M=1.9, SD=1.7; ANCOVA conducted p<.01) 
26. (QN) Families with children aged 0-6 (OR=4.8), 7-12 (OR=3.6), 13-19 (OR=2) reported evacuating during Fukushima disaster 
36. (QN) 2/3 expect support measures relating to physical health and safety, anticipated adherence increased in the 32% who expect psychological assistance if sheltering-in-place; 
non-adherence associated with prioritising collection or checking on children or other family members  
46. (QN) Situational variables related to evacuation: specific instructions to evacuate, disruption of telephone service, proximity to TMI (effects not reported) 
41. (QN) If knowledgeable of school evacuation plans/ children’s location: 55% of parents would ‘definitely’ (37%)/ ‘probably’ (17%) collect children (no significant difference 
from those who would not collect their children (14% ‘probably’/ 26% ‘definitely’)  
53. (QN) 96% willing to evacuate; 92% willing to shelter-in-place; reasons for non-evacuation: lack of transportation/ inconvenience/ expense; reasons for non-sheltering: wishing to 
reunite with family, preferring to leave quickly, lack of trust in public health officials 
32. (QN) Reasons for evacuating during TMI emergency: situational danger (91%), confusing information (83%), concerns with forced evacuation (76%), need to protect children 
(61%); reasons for not evacuating: not being ordered to (62%), conflicting reports (42%), believing no danger existed (38%), believing home to be safe distance away (31%)  
33. (QN) Reasons for evacuating during TMI: situational danger (30%), conflicting reports (19%), government advisory (14%), concerns w/ forced evacuation (14%); reasons for not 
evacuating: not ordered to (62%), conflicting reports (42%), believing no danger existed (38%), living safe distance away (31%), fear of looting (24%), having no children (23%), 
neighbours not having evacuated (16%)  
47. (QN) 13% would ignore evacuation instructions; three-quarters would evacuate in spite of sheltering instructions (particularly if > 3km from NPP) 
31. (QN) TMI evacuees more likely to have attained high school education, more likely female (69%), more likely parents (92%) 
54. (QN) Anticipated pre-incident responses to receipt of warning leaflet: self-evacuate if possible (23%), pick up children (30%), accept sheltering recommendations (96%) 
37. (QN) 84% would follow instructions to stay at home (15.5% would leave); community attachment predicted increased willingness to shelter at home; 94% of over 65’s, 70% of 
18-25s would adhere to sheltering instructions; 28% would shelter for 48 hours if knowing family safe (41% at work), 61% would leave work despite knowing building sheltering 
arrangements;  reasons for leaving: feel safer elsewhere (37%), find children (28%), find adult family member (25%), get food/ water (11%); bringing food, water, supplies directly 
to confined residents would increase cooperation (85% would shelter 48 hours at home, 75% at work) 
46. (QN) ~50% would evacuate given advisory ‘everyone living within 10km should evacuate’; 25% would evacuate given advisory ‘those living within 5km should stay indoors’; 
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34% would evacuate given advisory ‘pregnant women and pre-school children within 5km should evacuate, everyone else within 10km should stay indoors’; families closer to NPP 
most likely to evacuate  
47. (QN) 71.5% if no instructions issued would stay at home; if at work 71% (maximum scenario: multiple RDDs at 1 mile distance, wind blowing toward participant) to 41% 
(minimum scenario: single RDD at great distance) would remain in place; reasons for non-adherence (w/ 48 hour shelter instruction): to find adult family (29%), to find children 
(23%), feel safer elsewhere (11%), to get food/ water (8%); 69.5% (minimum scenario), 83% (maximum) would shelter 48 hours if told loved ones safe; 90% would shelter for >48 
hours if food/ water could be delivered (100% in maximum scenario); confidence in community ability to manage attack does not affect behaviour if at home (significantly 
correlated with staying at work in minimum scenario) 
55. (QN) 68% would shelter initially, 59% as long as instructed, 20% requiring more information to decide; trust in official pre-incident instructions correlated with anticipated 
adherence ; of non-adherence group: 33% would leave to find children, 28% for other family members, 22% would feel safer elsewhere, 7% believe they could avoid danger outside, 
6% to get meds/food/supplies; increased adherence if able to communicate with loved ones (+14%), if knowing loved ones safe (+12%); anticipated adherence 76% among those 
confident in workplace preparedness plans 
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Table 6. Preferences for information in the event of a radiation incident  (significant effects in bold) Risk of 
bias score 
Information 
Seeking 
52. (QL; QN) Sources likely used (during incident): media (TV), radio, internet, national level experts, word of mouth, emergency broadcast system, authorities understanding local 
situation 
42. (QL) Individuals made requests (during incident) for more information, consistency, clarity, regular updates 
51. (QL) Young men would want to find out more information (during incident) by seeking out peers  
57. (QL) Preferred sources (during incident): media, medical experts 
36. (QN) 52% sought (pre-incident) information from media, 62% from leaflet 
58. (QN) Majority (effect not reported) would call local agencies/ family/ friends/ local hospital (during incident); 86% would like guidance on emergency countermeasures/ food 
safety advice 
43. (QN) Some (effect not reported) sought information regarding potential impact before evacuating following advisory (during incident)  
24. (QN) Main information sources (during incident): neighbours, co-workers (effect not reported) 
53. (QN) (during incident) 14% would use internet for information, 56% television, 18% radio  
12. (QN) Nuclear emergencies likely to result in demand for phone services; Preferred information sources (during incident) friends/ family (92%), first responders (76%) 
56. (QN) 93% used media for information during Fukushima emergency 
38. (QN) Preferred sources (pre-incident): general internet searching (28%), government websites (21%), news websites (21%), local TV news (25%), family (24%), friends (21%), 
local radio (21%); Preferred sources (during incident): television network news (80%), (internet: news/ government websites (49%), social media (<2%), healthcare provider or CDC 
(<2%)) 
55. (QN) 77% ‘moderately’/ ‘extremely’ interested in learning more about government/ community organisation plans for (pre-incident) RDD response  
60. (QN) 77% would seek health-related information (pre-incident) about prevention, protection, symptoms and treatment, likelihood of further attacks (RDD emergency) 
50. (QL) Desired information: factual, protective actions, water/food contamination, actions of authorities (during incident); Zone maps requested (w/ advice/behavioural 
recommendations)  
37. (QN) Preferred sources (during incident): local TV news (68%), local radio (63%), national TV news (49%), internet news (26%), internet unspecified (22%), internet 
government site (16%), local newspapers (16%), family/ friends (16%), local police (10%), local fire dept. (6%), doctors/ healthcare providers (3%)  
40. (Experiment) Reasons for preference of (pre-incident) intervention leaflet over existing NSIL: simpler/easier to understand, more informative, offered pin-up summary, preferred 
pictures, preferred layout; NSIL preferred for familiarity, preferred layout, preferred pictures  
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Perceived 
credibility of 
information 
source 
52. (QL; QN) Concerns expressed that government will not distribute all information/lack of availability in different languages (pre-incident); recommended actions more credible if 
proven effective  
51. (QL) Limited trust in national media (local media preferred), local authorities (president directives preferred) (during incident) 
60. (QL) Information presented in media (during incident) viewed with suspicion; positive reaction non-governmental sources; ‘Independent scientist’ lost credibility as ‘chosen by 
media’  
50. (QL) Lack of consistency across messengers  (during incident)  increased confusion/ anxiety; leaflet recipients rated messages from authorities more credible 
57. (QL) 33% rated media  as a credible (pre-incident) source of information, 30% first responders, 16% academics/ scientists, 14% government  
63. (QN) (pre-incident) Respondents fell into 3 categories: trust information, not response (32%: most likely to adhere), distrust information and response (18%: least likely to adhere/ 
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prepare), trust local, not global (50%: likely to adhere with sheltering instructions, most likely to have an emergency plan) 
61. (QN) Scientists rated more trustworthy than authorities (t(458)=3.03, p<.05); authorities rated more trustworthy than industry (t(458)=6.554, p<.05); Authorities/ 
scientists rated equally competent (t(449) =-.14; p=.150), industry less competent (t(449)=3.6, p<.01) (pre-incident) 
53. (QN) 36.5% had most trust in the local public health department, 23%in local news, 11% physicians, 11% family members (pre-incident) 
27. (QN) (Slovenia) Trust in scientific information given by: Government (factor loading principal axis=0.779); agency for radioactive waste (axis=0.591); mayor (axis=0.530); 
ministry for environment and spatial planning (axis=0.735) (alpha=0.75, N=1200) (pre-incident) 
30. (QN) Perceived understandability (X=.981, SD=.138), reliability (X=.818, SD=.387) and relevance (X=.725, SD=.448) (pre-incident) consistent with course presenters giving 
information in basic terms  
38. (QN) Trust in source (pre-incident): president (~42%), homeland security (~22%), GP (~22%), surgeon general (~20%), religious leader (~20%), Governor (~19%), national/local 
news (~15%)  
37. (QN) National news most trusted source, followed by GP (pre-incident); least trusted: Mayor/ local religious leaders; medical professionals appearing on television perceived less 
reliable 
58. (QN) ~60% reported confidence in official information (during incident) (most likely women/ aged 26-40 years); 30% reported little confidence (most likely aged 41-60 years) 
31. (QN) Loss of faith in experts predicted by perceived TMI threat (multi R=.70, R2=.48, p=.000), perceived lack of control (multi R=.57, R2=.33, p=.000) (during incident) 
40. (Experiment) No significant difference between leaflets for trustworthiness (pre-incident) 
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Reception of 
information 
52. (QL) Many found information (pre-incident) confusing, unclear (such as not fully understanding the terms shelter-in-place or plume)  
49. (QL) A live voice (opposed to a recording) preferred in delivering messages (during incident) 
60. (QL) Intervention leaflet length, density and complexity of text, lack of illustrations, accessibility issues for groups with disabilities criticised ) (during incident) 
50. (QL) (during incident) Official recommendations suggested to go beyond providing facts by offering explanations for public health recommendations (also applied to official 
advice encouraging return to normal after sheltering and advice encouraging the public to attend a treatment centre 
59. (QL; QN) Confidence in knowing what RDD was (intervention group: M=8.76, SD=2.64; control: M=5.44, SD=3.75; t=2.78, df=28, p<.05, 95%CI=.87-5.77), how to 
respond (intervention: M=8.95, SD=1.5; control: M=6.67, SD=3.61; t=2.49, df=28, p<.05, 95%CI=.4-4.17), ability to carry out instructions (intervention: M=8.8, SD=.62; 
control: M=7.44, SD=1.94; t=2.87, df=27, p<.05, 95%CI=.386-2.3) in low literacy respondents given literacy aided material (pre-incident) 
40. (Experiment)  55.5% read all leaflet information (49% reported having understood it all) (pre-incident); 57% preferred trial leaflet to existing leaflet (31%); trial leaflet found 
easier to read than NSIL (F(1, 295)=19.347, p<.001, r=27); trial leaflet found easier to understand (59%) than existing leaflets (24%)  
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Appendix 2 
The following databases were searched for relevant publications: Medline (via OVID, Epub ahead of 
print (January 16 2017); In-Process and Other Non-Indexed Citations, Ovid MEDLINE (R) Daily and 
Ovid MEDLINE (R) (1946 to present) search conducted 17th January 2017); Embase (via OVID, 1974 to 
2017 January 16) search conducted 17th January 2017; PsycINFO (via OVID, 1806 to January Week 2 
2017) search conducted 18th January 2017; Web of Science (core collection) search conducted 20th 
January 2017.  
Database: Ovid MEDLINE(R) <Epub ahead of print (January 16 2017), In-Process and Other Non-
Indexed Citations, Ovid MEDLINE (R) Daily and Ovid MEDLINE (R) (1946 to present)> 
Search Strategy: 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 Fukushima /     (2122) 
2 exp Radioactive Hazard Release/px (Psychology)     (107) 
3 Fukushima .kw     (110) 
4 Chernobyl /     (5450) 
5 Chernobyl .kw    (61) 
6 Chenobyl /     (2) 
7 Chenobyl .kw     (0) 
8 "Three Mile Island" /     (191) 
9 "Three Mile Island" .kw     (1) 
10 Hiroshima /     (2025) 
11 exp Nuclear Warfare/px (Psychology)     (18) 
12 Hiroshima .kw      (3) 
13 Nagasaki /     (1698) 
14 Nagasaki .kw     (4) 
15 Sellafield /      (322) 
16 Sellafield .kw     (5) 
17 Windscale /     (67) 
18 Windscale .kw      (0) 
19 Kyshtym /     (51) 
20 Kyshtym .kw     (0) 
31 
 
21 Fukui /     (669) 
22 Fukui .kw     (1) 
23 Tokaimura /     (11) 
24 Tokaimura .kw     (0) 
25 - 30 
(Nuclear adj release (33) or accident* (1140) or disaster* (307) or attack* 
(105) or terror* (114) or emergenc* (167)) .ab,ti,kw. 
31 exp Nuclear Weapons /hi (History)      (77) 
32 "Radioactive Fallout"/     (4061) 
33 "Radioactive Fallout" .kw     (644) 
34 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30     (1774) 
35 
1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 
16 or 17 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 34 
(15253) 
36 "Dirty Bomb" /     (93) 
37 "Dirty Bomb" .kw     (3) 
38 "Radiological Dispersion Device" /     (18) 
39 exp Disaster Planning/hi, mt, td (History, Methods, Trends)     (2155) 
40 "Radiological Dispersion Device" .kw     (0) 
41 "Radiological Weapon" /     (6) 
42 "Radiological Weapon" .kw      (0) 
43 - 48 
(radi* adj5 (accident* (2934) or release (5405) or disaster* (204) or 
attack* (1583) or terror* (330) or emergenc* (3328))) .ab,ti,kw. 
49 Goiania /     (459) 
50 Goiania .kw     (0) 
51 Litvinenko /     (24) 
52 Litvinenko .kw     (0) 
53 "Polonium 210" /     (302) 
54 "polonium 210" .kw     (11) 
55 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48     (13207) 
56 
36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 54 or 
55      (16048) 
57 Shelter* /     (10062) 
58 Shelter* .kw      (220) 
59 "Duck and Cover"/     (7) 
32 
 
60 "Duck and Cover" .kw      (0) 
  61 evac* /     (20396) 
62 evac* .kw     (115) 
63 relo* /      (14588) 
64 relo* .kw     (120) 
65 Iodine/re (Radiation Effects)     (18) 
66 Behav* /     (1532356) 
67 Behav* .kw      (27776) 
68 Psych* /      (1369475) 
69 Psych* .kw     (70765) 
70 - 72 (respon* adj3 crisis (625) or emergenc* (5315) or public (4638)) .ab,ti,kw. 
73 adhere*/      (196883) 
74 adhere*.kw      (3624) 
75 engage*/      (127855) 
76 engage*.kw      (488) 
77 comply/      (9519) 
78 comply.kw      (1) 
79 compliance/      (152734) 
80 compliance.kw     (1333) 
81 communicat*/     (373405) 
82 communicat*.kw     (8136) 
83 Warning*/      (22296) 
84 Warning*.kw      (132) 
85 instruct*/     (94562) 
86 instruct*.kw     (320) 
87 70 or 71 or 72     (10578) 
88 
57 or 58 or 59 or 60 or 61 or 62 or 63 or 64 or 65 or 66 or 67 or 68 or 69 or 
73 or 74 or 75 or 76 or 77 or 78 or 79 or 80 or 81 or 82 or 83 or 84 or 85 or 
86 or 87     (3307960) 
89 35 or 56     (29685) 
90 88 and 89     (3776) 
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Supplementary Materials 
Downs and Black (1998), risk of bias checklist (adapted). Scoring: yes=1, no=0, unable to tell=0 
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Sco
re 
51 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 20 
38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 19 
42 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 19 
61 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 19 
59 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 19 
63 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 18 
12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 18 
62 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 17 
56 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 17 
50 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 17 
39 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 17 
34 
 
30 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 17 
29 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 17 
28 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 17 
40 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 17 
52 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 17 
34 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 5 16 
55 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 16 
60 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 16 
25 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 16 
48 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 16 
43 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 16 
37 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 16 
31 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 15 
26 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 15 
35 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 15 
36 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 15 
24 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 15 
41 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 14 
58 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 14 
54 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 13 
27 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 5 13 
35 
 
49 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 12 
44 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 12 
53 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 12 
57 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 12 
46 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 11 
47 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 11 
45 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 10 
33 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 n/a 7 
32 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 
 
 
 
